The Joint SOBE Processing Center, 1961-1971. A Brief ... | Summaries History | Docsity (2024)

Download The Joint SOBE Processing Center, 1961-1971. A Brief ... and more Summaries History in PDF only on Docsity! I . TOP SECRET/IGOMINT ,_ TAB B: (U) DOCID 2909802: an unredacted copy ofthe document. DEC LASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY O F THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSlFICA T JON APPEALS PANEL, E.O. 1352{), SECTION 5.3(b)(3) ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2008-018, document no. 1 DECLASSlFICA TION DATE: October 24, 2013 THIS PAGE MAY BE DECLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF.THE ENCLOSURES 'FOP SECRB'FHGOMINT . DOCID: 2909802 123 TOP SECRET I PH /A/_ /:. UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY The Joint SOBE Processing Center 1961 -- 197 1 ECURITY .. NATIONAL CRYPTOLOGIC SCHOOL PRESS This Document Contains Codeword Material 1 TOP SECRET - - - ····--· ---- ·---:------------- . . DOCID :·L 909802 TOP SECRET UMBRA I E.O. 13 52 6, section 3.3(b)(3) Preface Withheld from public r elease Pub. L. 86-36 coo Pac T he ten · yea r life span of the JSPC was prc:l.'eded by seven years of discussion. rdination and compromise on the concept of a theater Siginc processing center in the ilil· under the operational control of the Director. NSA. Thus the idea was born not long afte r che establishrnt-nr of NSA from the loose confederation of the Armed Forces Security Agency. The tarj:et represented by the communications .______________, ._______,1 lt>nt itself cu a theater processing cente r concept because it was a one-thea rer prob\em. The Soviet problem. screeching from Europe co Eastern Asia and from the Balric to rhe Black Sea. could not be attacked in this manner . The incnmisten9· beiween the two approaches would survive to hau nt the proj,onents of the JSPC in Iacer years. particularly when the theater processing assets of· the individual Servict' Crypto\ogi( Agencies on Soviet targets would be dissolved and concentrated ac Fe. Meade . The selling of the JSPC concept involved obtaining agreement that the whole. represented by a joint services COC¥di nated theater processing effort would be grea ter yet more economica l than the sum of the then existing parts. represented by the separate SCA theater processing assets. He~dquarrers USASA Pacific was located in Japan ac the rime chat che JSPC conl'epc was approved and implemented . But it was USM- 3 , Torii Station, Okinawa. which h~d assumed che status of a " super" ASA station.______________, communications target. The Naval Security Group elements were then . as they are now. withour a ·theater processing center as such. Each NSG starion engaged in collection had sufficient resources co conduct all processing and reporting up co the point where NSA rook over. The Air Force Security Service cheate r processing assets were represented by the 6922nd Radio Group Mobile; which had moved from Japan to Okinawa and brought with them responsibility I I ~~------~ By the fall of 1961 Colonel Kenneth E. Rice. USA. the first Chief of JSPC . his deputy. Mr. Frank C. Smith. and Mr. George F. Wooten, Jr. , the chief reporter - both from NSA. and Major Russel B. Jones, J r.. USA. their administrative assistant. were in place at Torii Station. With rhem were Miss Helen Nicewa rner. a secretary tra nsferred from the NSA Rt-presencarive J apan office. and a small cadre o f en listed personnel. The Chief of the NSAPAC Representative. Okinawa office~ Mr . Richmond D. Snow, was for a time- and until the transfer of his duties co the Chief of jSPC- collocated with •this advance party ro assist them during that difficult. initial period. From these modest beginnings the JSPC developed the missions and organizati on of its production divisions and staff elements. The human resources from :SC A cheater sices and from clements of NSA were grad ually moved to Torii Station . The decade o f progre~s and production had begun. By the summer of 1962. most of the resources scheduled for assignment tO the JSP<:; were in place. With over three hundred personnel on· board . the Center was I E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(3)u TOP SECRET UMBRA Withheld from public release J:"UO. L. "8"0-3() ­ - DOCID·: 2 909802 TOP SECRET UMBRAI E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(3) I W ithheld fr om public r elease Pub. L. 86-36 rtsponsible for theater-levtl processing and reporcing ~,_ ___ _______.l By mid-1969. the Centtr would bt at its maximum authorized mtngch and would have the addtd rtsponsibilir}· l The heterogeneous nature of the mission of the JSPC became more difficulr w explain co visitors, who consta nrly inquired as ro the rarionale for having only pam of the 1..----------------------J as~igned 10 the Cenrer. By 1965. the conrinued need for the JSPC btgan tv come under question within NSA . A plan was being developed for modernization of intercept and processing techniques . The plan has been called alcer'narively the Far East Moderni za ti on Plan and rhe PACEMA K ER Plan . The idea was that a semi-automatic intercept recording devict (usua ll y called · the AG-22 and consisring of an eltctric typewriter with extra keys for flagging specific communications elements such as callsigns. frequencies. chatrer. messages . etc.• and a paper tape punching capability), in combination wirh hi~h-spec:d data links w move the mass o f collected traffic w rhe waiting compucers eirher ar JSPC or Ft. Meade, would allow more traffic ru be processed at wearer speed and rhereby improve the machinery of processing and reporting. The fruition of the PACEMAKER plan was very slow in cominJ.:. Initially. the schtme was that small computers would be installed at tht inttrctpt sites . These devices were to bt used co generate T ECSUM-Iike reports from the input of1AG-22 capes. and the TECSU Ms were co be forwarded eleCtrically co J SPC for processing and reporting . This scheme gave way co an alternative of moving all of the AG-22 Ragged d at a scream via data links to the two IBM- 360 computers at JSPC. freein~ the sration from the requirement's of data reduction. Eventually, with the expected progress of rhe STRA ':X' HAT communications plan. whereby the capability would exist ro move the entire AG-22 flagged data stream co rhe waiting compurers at Ft Meade. the JSPC was cut out of the pattern and the end was in sighc. Tracing the birc~. growth an·d final demise of rhe JSPC is both fascinating and rewarding- fascinating because JSPC worked , rewarding because by the rime of its demise it could claim credit for rhe production of over eleven thousand Sigint reports annually . History and the austerity era under which all elements of the Department of Ddense must operate in these times have claimed the experimtnt . If rht decision was wrong we will not be long in finding our. but it is not likely co prove wrong. The same dedication and zeal shown in rhe creat ion of the JSPC is evidenced in the orderlr way it was disestablished. Consumers and rhe SCA elements ac the end of the line in the Pacific have been told thar rhe assumption by· NSA uf rhe responsibiliries previously held by the JSPC would be accomplished with no loss in rimeliness or quality of Siginr supporr. Thus far. chis commirment has bten upheld. and rhere is no reason why it should fail. TOP SECRET UMBRA iii IE.O . 13526, section 3.3(b)(3) - .. ---------------.=====;--~ Wi t hheld from public r elease Pub. L. 86-36 DOCID : 2909802 TOP SECRET UMBRI.. Acknowledgements This document is acknow ledged as the first attempt co assemble and convey pertinent information on the I 7 or so years that the cryptologic community planned for and dealt with the concept of a Sigint processing center on Okinawa. The last ten years saw that concept come to life in the operations of the Joint Sobe Processing Center at Torii Station, Okinawa. Over those ten years, the JSPC meant many things 10 many people: it encountered impassioned convictions from profound respect to hat red. from sublime appreciation to ridiculous misconception. and from pride in obvious accomplishments to fear of an equally obvious potential for even grea ter success. Although thousands of projects marked the JSPC era. as did tens of thousands of orders and dictums. unfortunately not on.ce was any comprehensive record initiated specifically for the benefit of posterity. Under these circ*mstances, one option would · he to allow the record of those ten years to remain in the memories of all concerned and pass without official comment. This is, of course, an unacceptable option . With a final spurt of judgment. it was decided that to let all thar the JSPC was and could have been pass unnoticec;l would be a disser vice _to the community of which the Center was such an important part and an injustice to all [hose who devoted so much energy to its success as well as to its demise. With these convictions. during the last year of ]SPC operations, operating and staff elements· attempted to reconstruct the past as best they could. Th is document was compiled during the last three months of rhe Center. This account of a unique organization is informal and to some degree biased, for it was prepared at \he J SPC. by JSPC pt:rson.nel. from· scanty records and liberal memories. · We wish w thank all contributors ro this .document-particularly those managers, reporters and analysts who uncovered some rare old records and personal papers that survived earlier clean-up campai~ns. Withheld from public release Pub. L. 86-36 Editors. iv TOP SECRET UMBRA .. _. ..___ . - ---- ­ DOCID :_2.9_0.9.8 0 2 ! TOP SECRET UMBRA A S(XCilic point was made b)· the committee : that there were no essential differences in Comint requirements dunn~ (Xace and war. The actions recommended to DI RNSA by the committ« were expansive. a . They proposed the establishment of three joint £i eld h k d . h process1ng centers. eac tas e Wit ma1or na­ tiona! tarws: l l E.O . 13526, section 3.3(b)(3) I Withheld from public release r uu. L . OQ-JvI b. Each center would have full responsibility for second echelon processing and repo rting. control of wnrribucing intercept facilities, and technical support tO first echelon processing . c. These centers would be manned with techni. c1ans from NSA and the three SCAs, and ir was envisioned that the NSA personnel would be assigned in quality and quantity sufficient to insure a continuing technical proficiency. d. Best av:tilable manpower would be grouped CO· gether fo r coordinated arcack of targets of mutual concern because - in the words of the committee -"it is re.adily apparent that grou ping . rather than dis per. sal, pays the greater dividends (and ) greatly reduces train ing and replacement problems ... The essence of t he plan was that the pooling of re . sources , and the consolidation and joint use of u:chni · cal experience. equipment. machine facili ties and services would "result in savings ... That was the imaginative concept presented to the Director and Vice Director, NSA. on 15 Februar>· 1956. Bur when the crucial question of designatio~ authority to direct the center was raised. according til the commiuee report .. political consider ations began to affect opera tional considerations." The next .five years w¢re consumed no less by dis· agreem~nt with and debate over the· NSA·proposed concept and its inherent connotation of disruption and change to ultra- and inter.SCA relationships. than between the SCAs and NSA over the issue of controlling Sigint resource's. Probably no complete or ade<juate record of these events exists. Tw o points, ho wever. were important tO the later scope of JSPC authority and effectiveness. BrieRy stated , they were: 2 TOP SECRET UMBRA DOCI D: 2909802 a. The question of reporting echelons. or levels .of processing and reporting effort. The committee and the Director debated this question and agreed that there were three levels and only three. Yet. at that time, not all SCA activities adhered to the three echelon concept. Notably, the NSG sites incorporated first and second echelon efforts into a single level of attack that was felt by some to be the most realisr.ic and efficient approach. However. two echelons of effort were distinguishable in the activities of the ASA site at Torii Station (USM­ 3), and the AFSS site at Kadena Air Base (! JSA-752) was UQiquely a second ech.elon center. Both units had functioned along those lines for some time. (lrrespec· rive of divergent views at the t ime, che .. three echel on .. concept was generally accepted and became a primary ingredient of the official JSPC Concept of Operations implemented in 1962. But ten years later, the two echelon concept ~:merged as first instance , theater level and national level. Ultimately. theater level was to be d iscontinued .) b. The second issue was that of vertical control under the Director, NSA. The Director and the com­ mittee agreed that the Comint business worked better with a vertical command and that if the business was sufficiently responsive to military requirements, prob­ lems resulting from the command structure would work themselves out. lt was recognized, however, that this feature of the concept would be problematical at best . The principal SCA objections to this approach were prognosticated by the committee to be: (I) Vertical control - exercised through a uni· fied center. NSA technicians, and field activities-­ would be extended to problems theretofore decen tral­ ized and to first eche lon reporting. and thus would be unacceptable to field commanders, contrary to previ­ ously expressed NSA . policy. and in conflict with NSCJD 9 ; (2) Vertical control involving non -routine matters would be exercised directly on elements of service field units in bypa~s of SCA headquarters. and thus would be unacceptable to the SCAs and in con­ fli<;t with NSA Directive # 1; (3} Vertical control would be reinstituted on problems for which full operational control already had been delegated to one of the SCAs; and (4) Vertical control that bypassed SCA head. quarters would relegate those headquarters to purely administrative and logistic functions and thereby destroy their effectiveness for wartime operations. TOP SECRET UMBRA Ultimately a plan emerged for a Joint Sigint Oper ­ ations Center on Okinawa. The name soon was changed co the Joint Sigint Processing Center , ocher a.djuscments were made to the plan. and a final plan was approved by the OSD on II January 1961. The charter for the JSPC cook the form of an attachment to OPINS 4001 . dated 9 March 1901. The key features of this charter were that: a. The Center would be a forward extension of NSA and a consolidation of the then current field efforts into one organization; b. The entire resuurces of the Center wo uld be at the disposal of a si_ngle Chief of the operation; c. The Chief of the Cerher would be an NSA-as­ signed military officer : d. NSA would exercise operational control through the Chief of the Center; and e. Chiefs of rhe incorporated service elements would be under the operational control of the Chief of the Center. Even with success in coordinating and promu lgating OPJNS 4001. there remained some serious objections to this charter by the SCAs. It d id not provide for, a derailed, Clear-cut, universally accepted understa nd ­ ing within the Sigint community- or even within NSA-as co the true. legal status of the JSPC. In the words of the first Chief, JSPC. it was a question of: To what extent was it, or should it be, an ..integrated.. or "joint"' activity? To whom did it, or should ir. belong? What was or should be the mutual SCA . responsibility for the fulfillment of the assigned mis­ sion? The plan approved by the SECDEF was a com ­ promise between what the DIRNSA and SECDEF wanted and what the Chiefs of the SCAs were willing to agree to. Deficiencies of the char ter as pertaining to command relationships, manpower allocations and related provisions were to present acute problems for the new JSPC to struggle with.. some for a number of years . Although its era was tO begin with certain impor· rant issues unresolved. positive actions were taken to get the JSPC underway . On 4 Ap~il 1961 , the Deputy Chief was appointed as the Pro ject Officer. The USASA nominated an officer of 06 rating for the Chief's position . He was officiall y assigned by DIR · NSA on I May . Subsequent events are discussed in Part II , "The Early Years." After seven _years of\ preliminary a~tions, a Joint Sigint Processing Center ~as almost a realtty. TOP SECRET UMBRA 3 I. - - · --========================~------------------~~--====~-- DOCID: 2909802 TOP SECRET UMBRA II. The Early Years Getting Organized By Se ptember of I '161. the Ch ief. an Arm~· colonel. wns in place at Torii St;rtion. O kinawa . home r;f tl rt 5 1st l iSASA Special Operations Cmnmand iSO() and it> npt·ratil>ns elc:rntm . ( llSM- 31. Sh<•rd y there-after. ( W() Army majors and I I e nlis ted rncn joi n<·d hirn. Anion haJ not as vet bee n take n to assign the Chid. as an NSA oflicer : thrs mea nt rha t he was strl l assi)!ned ro th e lJS ASA and therdore part ot rhe USASA ckmenr at l iSM- ) which was destined tll heco rrr~:e rh ~ "liS Army El~:erne n r: .J oin t Si)!int Processing Cen ter. O kinawa ." LISASA Ge n­ <·ral O rclers :\'umher ·i3. da ted 24 July 1961. mllcle th< Chief and part)' .. a .~epa rate anivicy ( Class II ) at Tr>nr Station . Okinawa . Ryukyus Islands . und er the Tahle n l Diwibution Numbe r ~6-lJ340 . .. Admi11istrative A ctivatio n T lw c hief anivatt·d :he n~·" Ce nter lnr ,ldmrnr,cra ti,t· pur pose, r> n I ( ktt> her I <)(,1 · An unpuhlishtd nr.~:ani; a. tion manual datnl I 'i Nll\ e rnber I 'll> I rr,· e;rl~ th.u tht· i nit ial!) planned nrj.:J nit.~ ti"n did not at hrst rn;Jtcori .ditt . The fir~t pla n app<lrtntl" ca 11<-d for a t our -~w If. frn·-di \ ' J· sinn ~trunure (as bt~: r er uc:r.t.:ed I. h ur rht li r)r , .Hiri:rl or~ani~;rrion consisted ••{ two ~tarf gru up~ . e;rch <'iHJSrsc· inl! of thr ee com ponc:ot' . (lOt ,croup ot' rompont·nrs rep­ rese nced the ).!tnesi ~ " ' J SPI -o :~. O<'r .tnd 0 ~ r>f fatc:r ''ears. One salient rt-nturt >I d r< ~:~rli~:~ t .JSPC or.c ,r nit.rrion wa s tha t it !ar,t.:ely pa ra ~ k!t. l rr •ost <If tht· rounterp.trt and pa rent t:lc:ments of NS:\ . ;rn,l wllc:rt rt did nt>t iniu all\' . suose<prent rea li):nrnem~ were nwdt. ( 'nrgu<: fca rurr:s of Opening Ceremony. Vice-Admiral Lau rence R. Frost, O I RNSA, cut s tbe ceremonial ribbon, while Col. R ice , Chief, JSPC ( left), and otber dignitaries look on. I TOI? SECRET U MBRA: 5 DOCII;) _:___2_~0_~-e.Q ~ . - -·- -- - -·· - - -···--··- ·-- - - - ---- ---- ­ TOP SECIU!T UMBRA JSPC operation. and it appears ro be a document pro­ vided w the NSA Inspector General during his ear ly I ~68 visit. As a comprehensive statement of the problems faced by JSPC manaj(ement. the full record is quoted as follows. Chief. JSPC has up~ta~ional control and che local SCA Com . manders have comand and adm inistrative comrol over ~rsonnd assigned to JSPC These relationships are not clearly detined in JSPCs basic docu ment . OPINS 4001. JSPC is ~uided by NSA policies and regula tions: the SCAs are guided by their own sep· arate and distinct service poli<ies and regula tions. In severa l areas lilur set~ nf ru les are ac wide variance. Only chc finest of coopera. cion of th~ loca l SCA commanders. within th eir severe limitations . has allowed chis situation to serve JSPC in an adequate manner. Examples follow: · 1. Adminisrration a . JSPC military personnel are the administra tive responsibility of the followinj,( commandinj( officers. all of whom must tie dealt wit h at one time or another . ASA Officers & Civilians CO. 5 1st USASA SOC ASA EM CO. Co C. 51st USASA SOC NSA/ASA Officers CO. USA Spc Grp. Fe. Meade NSA/ASA EM C:O . Co B. lJSA Spr Grp, Ft. Meade NSG Officers & EM CO. NAVSECG RI.'ACTY . Okinawa NSA/NSG EM ~SGA, Ft. Meade llSAFSS Officers CO. 6927th SG USAFSS EM . CO. Det 2, 6927th SG NSA/USAFSS EM 6970th Spt Grp. Ft. Meade Marines CO. Co D. MARStJPTBN b. Some of the di fficulti~ encountered can be illustrated by che differences in the handling of efficiency rat ings. The Army can nnly indirectly affect JSPC officer personnel as efficiency ratings arc forwarded through NSA channels. or di rectly to TAG . Air Force efficiency rat ings are forwarded through the local command. cr who can make comments. In theca~ of Navy and Marine Corps ~rsonnel. the local CO has reporting authority: Chief. JSPC can only recommend the effectiveness ratings. which are subject to the fedings of CO. Co D, and CO. NSG A-0. who need not accept che J SPC recommendations. c. Command Channel Problems.-The Brief Sheet on che CCP expresses genera l satisfaCtion with the va rious steps involved in che CCP cycle from the initial statements ofJSPC require ments to DOD approval and subse<juent publication of OPINS I 0/20/30. However, OPINS requirements arc not accura te ly reRccted in the ma nning documents of the three SCAs. Thcs~ Ia uer documents should be ba~d on O PI NS 10/20/30 and clearly detail grades. ~kills and numbers of personnel provided to J SPC In JSPC at· tempts to accomplish chis. and to effect changes to existing USAFSS UMD. USASA TD. NAVSECGRU NAVPERS 576. J SPC has been informed to correspond as follows: Army- ASA says to cake all actions coCO. Slst USASA SOC. who will forward that which he canno t accomplish th rough ASA channels. Final action can be taken only by HQ USASA. Washington. Navy and Marines - NAVSECGR!J says take all action di· rectly to D IRNAVSECGRU as NSGA-0 has no autho rity . Air f orce - USAFSS says take manning problems to 6927th SG: authorizations will be handled by HQ at Kelly. In aCtuality. the local SCA units and the SCA thea tre head ­ quarters have very little aut hority in the authorization/ assignment 8 TOP SECRET UMBRA of personnel. In all caseSj this funcc iun is exercised centrally at SCA HQ in Zl. Therefore. under the cur rent system. JSPC needs stro ng central authority at OIRNSA !cvd co acc o n our ~rsnnnd requirementS/actions. Hopefully. establishment of JSPC: as ~n NSA organization would accomplish this end and improv~ r~a(· tion time within th e three separate and dist inCt service ~rsonncl authorilation/ assignmen t systems. 2. Shor tages a. JSPC cominucs co be plagued with ~rsonnd shorta,:cs :utd it is impossible for us co accept. in light of our vita l mission. that the situation musc continue to some extent on the grounds that JSPC must share some of the communicy .wide. shorrage of person ­ nel. b. The situa tion becomes mo~t cr itical when tasks are levied upon JS PC with no commensurate increase in personnel. For ex· ample : ( I ) JSPC has had to prov ide analytic personnel to supj<>rt various special intercept missions. even . collcccion person nel w man positions, a nd rhen devote many manhours to the ev~luatinn nf all material collected, ( 2} An insufficient number of personnel were assi;:ned w JSPC whe n che DRV Air problem was transferred here. Very rcc~ncly. four o f the tivc Vittnamese linguists working in th~ Air Division were sent TOY co USA- 32 to assist in ACRP operaci<•ns. ( B Group sent a DRY analyst to JSPC and HQ USAFSS has pro · vided two traffic analysts on TOY basis to assist whil~ the JSPC linguist personnel arc TOY}. · (3) Increased ACRP collection resulted in JSPC havin,~t w process the material from \h ose fligh ts chat recover at Kadena AB. th is has been acc~mplished only through e xtensive extra efforts on the part of senior linguists, . ( 4) Personne l to man t~ \Ten ~rsonnel have been diverted from ":o::-:c-;:-h::er:-.d:;:u-::t-;-:ie:s-::co:-:pe::r:tfo::r::m::-;:~..:.:.:.~::.: processing and reporting effom , (~) The automatic dimibution center became operational without adequate authorized ~rsonnel. The ADCC/DDP system conti nues to o~rare with a shortage of ckrks/communicatit•ns personnel by utilizing traffic analysts diverted from other tasks . c. Shortages exist in all tasks performed at JSPC from th e vita I areas of traffic analys is and linguistics to graphic artS and repro­ duction ~rvices. 3. S.,curity a. The ~rsonnel security situ,ation at JSPC ~as several ph ases which do not lead to an. es~ciaUy desi rable situation. This is brought about by the fact that there are four different setS of reg . ulations and standards util ized to govern the personnel workin,~; at JSPC . T hese are th e NSA regulations for all personnel assi!:ned f() NSA (both military and civilian}; ASA regulations for all Armv personnel as.signed to the S lSI USASA SOC: NSG regula. tion; for all Navy and MariM Corps person~~tt assigned to NSGA-0 and Co D. MARSUPTBN ; and AFSS regulations for all Air Force ~rsonnel assigned to the 6927th SG. b. It is necessary for the JSPC Security Officer. who is assigned to JSPC from the Office qf Security. NSA . t~ go to .each militar y security re presentative on an almost d a1ly bam to ga•~ knowledge of derogatory information pertaining to perS<>nncl work1ng 1n J SPC on JSPC/NSA mat erial. In many cases. the local military commands have removed the access of personnel working at JSPC . while they were und er investigat ion and upon completion of the 2909802 .inveitigation have returned th e individual for duty without CO· ordinating any aspect of the cam with the Chief, JSPC, llVhO has responsibility for the security of material at JS PC: In other cases, personnel are Uiigned to )SPC with obsolete background i nveS~i· gations when I~ NSA criteria nates that the HI mU$1 be brought up-to-date every five years. I n one cue an individual, who inci ­ dentall y was removed from acc.eu 10 JSPC/NSA material. was assigned 10 JSPC in 1963 with his clearance based on a 1951 BI. '· In other areas there are differen ces in application of various service regulations. 0 nc such are~ is unofficial foreign travel (leave) 10 foreign . countries. DCID 6/3. which was published by lJSIB on 29 Dec 59. $pecifies thar Comi nt indoctrinated person · ncl will be assigned a Hazardous Activ ity Group ( HAG ) Category wh ich co uld in many ca~ re$1rict uavel ro ·cercain foreign coun· tria. Certain remiccions are levied on NSA personnel desiring to travd tO various foreign counrrics. The counrrics mal' change from ti~c to ume, consequently a list published by DIRNSA on a monthly and as-needed basis is utilized for criteria as to countries where travel is authorized. At present the Chief. JSPC, has no authority to determine whe ther milit~rr perwnncl working •t JSPC should be restricred from unofficaal travel to various coun· tries. d. It ii obvious that the only way that JSPC can share the sa~ .sense of .security awareness as docs NSA. is to have the ume reg· ulations applied tO everyo~ having access ro NSA classified in · forma cion. In this way, JSP<: would ~ in a bett~r position tO pm· tcct irs information and in tum th~ S«urity of the United Statt's. 4. The final solution to mo~r of the ~bo~e problems is to establish JSPC as a purely NSA organization, utilizing NSA channels. pol­ icies, procedur<s and ~uonnd . To this end we ~re pr~pa ri ng a new OPINS 4790 w replace 4001 Primary points of th is dO<·u· ment will be: 11. JSPC is ~n NSA Organization. b. Personnel will report to the Chief, JSPC, and be supported logistically and administratively by the loC21 SCAs. c. J SPC will deal ""ith NSA on all manning. personnel and security matters. d. ~tilization of JSPC ~rsonMI by local SCA Comm:mdw will be in accordance with NSA polacics in effect at f t. Meade. t. NSA .securaty standards and ptocedures wrll be apphed to all aspects ofJ SPC's activities. These provisions of the new OPINS were expeCted w alleviate many of the problems perceived and dealt with by JS~C management. As the J SPC closed in 1971 , there remained considerable variance of opinion about how well OPINS 4790 accomplished its purpose. A key provision of 4790 was that the "JSPC is an NSA organization," as compared with the provision that the "JSPC is a single integrated NSA-directed or~anizati on" whirh appeared in the original OPINS 100I . The contrast between thl'se provisions was intend ed, among other things, to clearly show that the: JSP C was no longer just "NSA-direeted," but rather that it was part of 1\SA . T his difference was viewed as one which expanded considerably the authorities and responsibilities of the Chief from what the y could be under the old OPINS 400 l. This difference was likened to that between being a chairman of the board of directors - a referee-and being the d irector - -the TOP SI!Cit£'f' U:MBRla boss. Henceforth under OP INS 4790. the Chief of JSPC wa~ to be part of the NSA chain of command in the same way the ChiHs of PROD . or 8 Group are part of that chain . And ~SA man agement believed that the Chief of JSPC should therefore be able to run , to manage, 10 direcc , w wnuol, rhe anivities and the personnel of the JSPC w a degree far greater than before. OP INS 4790 was further di luted by additional a~ree­ ments such as the Memorandym of Understanding be· tween ADPM and USASA dated 20 November 1968. This agreement left no doubt that all USASA personnel working in the JSPC were under the: cnmmand of the local Field Station Commanding Officer . NSAPMM 30-2 also made it cleo~r that local SCA Commanders could place administrative derails. impe<:tions. train · ing, picnics . ere.. ablwe the opera tiona I requirements of the Center. While chapter 21 ') of NSAP M M 30-2 may work for lar~e organi~a tions such as NSA, Ft. Meade, the experience: over the past ten years has proved that it will not work for small fic:Jd activi ties. The smaller the unit · the more critical the problem. One person normally has several jobs in a small unit. and when ordered to training, KP . Article 32 In· vestigations. etc.. tben the operational job is simply not done . He is a soldier first and a technician second . In one documented case. five persons were put on report and investigated for disciplinary action for missing a personnel inspection . because they were required for operational work in their norma l job. Court-martial charges were actually drawn up al t hough later dropped. Additionally, for several months one local SCA Commander refused to give leave to personnel .on duty l"ith the JSPC although both the operational supervisor and Chtef of the Center had concurred in authoriting leave for the individuals. Needless to say this ~ituatioa. did not lend itself to a high morale amo ng the workers of the NSA Organization. ft was almost impossible to develop any type of high esprit de corps in this type of atmosphere. including the fact that J SPC military personnel could not participate in sports activity as a NSA sponsored organiution. The Chief of the JSPC was in fact placed in an al· ;::; most untentable position by nor having n>rn pltte au· c: thorit y to control his personnel. This could tia\'e been .5: avoided by doing what other organizations have done to ~ solve the problem. The I Ichan lied the ~ name of their top manager from Chief to Commander. :;:l The USASA did the same thing . Chief of the Agency and ~ major overseas Commands became Comrnandinli Gen - O era Is/Officers. The term Commander is entirely different ~ from Chief and carries a higher degree of authority and s ~ \0 <I) ~0 e': I.!:: ~\0 "0 ~00 ~ I. .,j- -~ ..c :C.ci ~ c,=Q..= TOP SECRET U MBRA 9 .- - - ---- - -··-- -·­ DOC:;I:O .: 2909802 IE.O. 135)6, sectio n 3.3(b)(3) I Withheld from public release · Pub. L. 86-36 ---·- - ---·-·-··- ---· ---- ­ TOP SECRET U:PffBRA acknowledgement. It would be well co consider giving all . NSA field activities a Commander vs a Chief. It is hardly justiliahle 111 state that .J~PC management accepted the provisions of OPJNS 4790 with all the en­ thusiasm and resolve ther could muster. Management of the Center possessed all the ri!(ht qualities co make any concept work that was workahle at all. But command and operational relationships rerna1ned probr'ematical unti l the JSPC closed on I Jul)· 1971. OPINS 471)0 made the }.\Oal of running the Center somewhat more clear admin­ istratively. but it did not .guarantee or result in full meas. ure of cooperation from the SCAs with which the Chief had to deal. The realit y of running the Center was only sli,~:htly improved. Perhaps if the provisions of OPINS 471)0 had been promulgated when the JSPC was created. the Cencer's place in command and operational relation­ shtps could have been less tro ublesome. Crisis on Crisis The new JSPC was enmeshed with the task of getting its house in order when the fi rst operations Rap struck in June I 962. All of the line elements were 1 n place ex­ cept JSPC-3 which was in the process of moving at the time. and the then -existing staff functions were strug­ ,~:ling co both coalesce their related tasks as well as establish clean lines of demarcation betwt'tn them. The acid cest of the new Center 's capability be;:an when USM-48 at Hakata. Japan, first reported that accord ­ in~ to their radio direction findi ng results . it appeared that the radio facilities serving elemencs c1f the If all the details and all the records could be gotten to,gether. the Sigint record of events for the next ten months would fill volumes. USF-790's product for the period is avai lable in the Agency's archives and the year -end products serial closure notices for 1962 and 1963 reveal the extent to which the new JSPC kept the community abreast of target activit )'- The ACOM cri ­ tique of Sigint Readiness Bravo.- "LAWRENCE." neatly capsul ized the scope of concern that developed after J une 1962. 10 TOP SECRf'f UMB~A In retrospect, and excluding lntellige·nce portc:-nt of the period. the most important aspect in this period was that the JSPCs performance did not falter during t h~t first and most important emergenc -nor did the )SPCs . performance ·fairer even as the The new Center was barely organized, and not L--~ of its elements were in place. yet it had co respond to the critical needs for rapid reporting based on accu­ rate , comprehensive assimilation of technical materia ls. · At the onset of the pre-Readiness period. imern::pt resources were deployed in a mix whirh ·until then had seemed most appropriate for the sites I I I I It soon became· apparent that chis distribution and deployment of re ­ sources was inadequate. With the appearance ·of lar,~:e numbers of ·radio groups serving the deployment of the units and the coordination and administrative mntrol over them the fundamental challenges faced by the new Center were multi-fold : a. All the Siginc resources and the capabilities the Center represented had to be coordinated immedia tely; there was precious lic'de time for deliberation and de­ bate ab<.lut how this could best be done . Re,ports were coming in from the outlying sites, and •.he Center was expected co respond in the most accurate and timely manner possible. b. The process of review and comparison of incom ­ ing technical materials from the sites had to be at once effective and efficient. c. The mix of intercept capabilities at the various sites had to be rearranged. Operators and processing and reporting (P&R ) personnel had to be apportioned among the sites, all of which were looking to JSPC for guidance and instruction . d. W ithin the Center, a mechanism for coordinated evaluation and interpretation of reportable activity had co be established immediately tO insure that all report· able infqrmation was processed and released in time co allow the daily cycle to continue. Any backlogged con­ ditions would have proved to be disastrous. For a few days, confusion was rampant throughout the Center. A central point of receip« for incoming ma­ terial from the sites and from NSA had not yet been established, nor were the various elements of JSPC certain of what they should not receive . Within a few days and after considerable work, however. all the requirements inherent in timely reporting and follow-on . IE.0.135.26, section 3.3(b)(3) I .-·-·- ­ Withheld from .. ------+-...a:....:. public !_"_elease Pub. L. 86-36 DOCID : 2909802 W ithheld fr om .-------;.•c:...· --·_--.... --- ···· . .. - ··· - · -· ·- - - ­ - -· .... - ·---···· ­ 1 E.O. 1352~, seCtion 3.3(b){3)(6) I public release ! Pub. L. 86-36 TOP SECRET U P.tBR:A sires covenng CHJCOM and DRV air communications to}lether with inputs from the ACRP program I I l I As air strikes o~er North ' Vietnam were initiated. pressure on the PACOM cq·ptologic effort mounted . jSPC-3 was at once faced with continuous mteranion with SCA collection and reporting units, NSA producti o n elements following all tar~et activity for quick response ro the Wash ington Intelligence Com­ munity. Pacifi<: cuswmers from South Vietnam co Hawaii with unceasing questions concerning Sigint informa ti on, and internal JSPC elements tasked with continuin_l( support co ever-changing needs in collection. data processing. multi-channel processing, cryptanaly­ sis, reporting and ma nning. Many important records on the details <lf th is period are no longer avai lable, hut che essence uf the JSPC role was the near- ~ mpossible requi rement co: a. 1 Stay abreast of all acci vity r.elated w and af. fecting the U.S. military role in SEA; b. Respond immediately to any. need or question rhe cryptologic and intelligence communities posed : c. Verify SCA analysis and reporting while .con­ ductin}( a type of imeJlrated and joint anal ysis and reporting possible only, it seemed. ar rheJSPC and d Answc:r for dela ys. backlogs. errors. omissions or what -have -you to virtually every major NSA produc­ ti o n element or intell igence cuscumer that had anyth ing whatever rodo wich rhe l! .S. interest in SEA. Support to ACRP The ACRP program was ~ew. In its heginning it was called QUEEN BEE DELTA in the Far Ease and consisted of USAFSS airborne assets operated by USA­ 513. primarily from Yokota Air Base, Japan . C-1308 aircraft wnfigured with ten intercept positions each and covering the electromagnetic spectrum from .2-4450 MH:t flew approximately 60 missions· of 10-hours duration each month in orbi ts from the Sea of Japan to the G ulf of Ton k in (G OT) against KORCO M . CH I ­ CO M and SEA targets. Thirty of these missions were flown in the GOT against cacrical targets in North Vietnam. in South China and on Hainan Island. and the number of these missions was destined ro increase significantly over future mon ths. The value of the AC RP program was clear. Land-based collection sites could collect only a small amount of the VH F !lnd low­ V HF transm issions emanating from the target area . However, from altitudes. of 30.000 feet. the collection ·reach · was extended by at least 250 miles - and the results were 1nvalu~ble. Early in the program. intercept yielded the fi rst evidence ( Ma y 1965) chat Russian pilots were involved in tactical air acuvHy over North Vietnam , evidence of the fi rst joint Russian/ Vietnamese GCI exercise (july 1965). insight inro the ..scrssors.. taCtics •mple­ menred by North Vietnamese fighter pilots (july 1%5!. and the first and viral evidence of Russian controlled surface-co-air missile launches against U.S .. strike air­ craft (26 July 1965). The involvement of the JSP<; embraced mission scheduling . tasking , monitoring and evaluation. and included linguisti c, processing . analysis and reportinJ; functions on materials collected. A JSPC representative participated in the monthly ACRP scheduli ng confer· ences at Yokota Air Bast: and assisted in the formula ­ tion of the rwo-monrh scheduling plans which collated the collection requirements of NSA. USA-38 (Misawtl Air Base} and JSPC and were the n passed through Headstrong channels to NSA for review . As the Inter­ cept Tasking Authority (ITA). JSPC levied specific collection tasks on lJSA- 513 for Q UEEN BEE DELTA coverage of KORCOM. CH ICOM and North Viet ­ namese targets . To ensure that all requirements were adequately satisfied , jSPC analysts closely monitored the fl ying sched ules daily. When high priority cullec ­ tio n requirementS arose for areas on which no coverage had been scheduled, last minute cha nges were made to the mi ssions , often with as few as I 2 hours notin: tu the operating units. All platform intercept was routine­ ly evaluated by the JSPC , with resu Its publ ished ev~ry 28 days. Results consistently showed that all but a small portion of the total intercept avai lable in the tow­ VH F and V HF spectrum was being collected by ACRP platforms and chat chis intercept was v.iral to the JSPC mission. The most critica l impact of the A CRP program on JSPC and theater crypto logic unics was th e depletion o£ linguisti<: resources . The JSPC processed all in tercept from missions that recqvered at K adena Air Base . Okinawa; all missions that recovered in South Vietnam passed their collection to USA-32 ar Danang Air Base. and USA-513 at Yokota processed all materials re­ covered ar home hase. JSPCs pan icipation in th is effort was an obvious move. A limited number of lin­ guists were available ac rhe Center. b ut even fewer were available to the ocher units, and USA-513, in particu ­ lar. needed relief. For the U.S. 7th Fleet Beginning in August I 965. the jSPC was tasked with the close Siginr support to U.S. 7rh Fleet elements committed co military operations against North Viet · nam. Timely, derailed information about the air dl' ­ fense systems of North Vietnam L----------' E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(3)(6) .1 14 TOP SECRET UMBRA Withheld from I public r elease -----------------------------+~f»'1Tub"' -:- ~·.-tL.~86fi:-:'t<J6 Withheld from DOCID: 2909802 public releas e IE.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(6) Pub. L. 86-36 . wJ~ needed . Specifica lly needed was the operatin~ i· characteristics and praccices of selected radar scacions l and filter centers and in ; North Vietnam, together with precise locations. types and capabili ties o f the units. and in gentra l, any wm· ment chat JSPC ana lyses thoug ht migh t be of value. To support chis effort , USA- 32 ac Danang Air Base. ·svN. and USA-5 7 at Clark Air Base. R.P .. forwarded co the Center first heard reportS which contained current co~sc noracions. callsi.~tn/RAD identifications and daca on the frequencies used bv the various air warning facilities . · . All informacion as ir was developed was passed electrically from the JSPC to 7th Fleet operational Siginr dttachmenrs co assist their intercept and tdencification of C HICO M and North Vietnamese air warnin~ unirs that could be expected to crack and report their own arrd U.S. aircraft. I COMINT Weather Inrercepc of North Vietnamese weather data pro· vided the on ly access to chis informacion from the earliest days of U.S. optracions in SEA. USA-32 at Danant: and USM-808 at Phu Bai provided the infor · mation direc:dy to MA CV (SOG) and co USN-27 ac San Mi]!uel, R.P .. for hroadcasc co CTf- 77 consumers. NSAPAC Represe ntative Vietnam (C) · had seen the need co establish a specia l weather support program co tnsure chat strike planners received all usable weather inf11rmation as well as to provide that data chat would aid the costly weacher reconnaissance program. The JSPC was asked co assist in chis prowam by providing u:do nica I consultants co N RV. and w cask the si tes with reporting che specific types and amounts of weather informacion most needed. · Suhsequencly. rhe JSPC monitored rhe data di~ ­ semin ated and assisted the reporcinl( si tes as necessar)'. CHICOMS Across the .&rder By mid-] une. 1965, Siginc clearly revealed chat CHICO M military forces were in North Vietnam, actively assisting the North Vietnamese in some way . F. videoce suggested that ac least one and possibly cwo CHJCOM Ground Forces units or authorities were in Nor th Vietnam . On 2( July 1965 , a special task force was activated within ch e JSPC Ground Forces Division OSPC- 1) to coordinate all Siginc collection efforcs against these com munications, to correlate SIT data and co provide guida nce and technical support co che collection sites invol ved in che effort. The JSPC Technical Support 101' 5fCRET UMBRA Division (jSPC-4 ) also mounted special effortS co assist in collection and analysis of developing CFNVN com­ municati ons complexes. They .cond ucced in-depth studies of callsign usage. correlated direction finding results which were excrernely important for accurate placement of elements, and per-formed transcription of CH ICOM and Nort h Vietnamese voice and radio primer commu· nicacions. They also developed a number o f special purpose machine Jiscin~s and studies co aid in analysis and exploi cation of chis significa nt cargee. The U.S. Ince!ligence Community tmpaciently had awaited Stgint confirmation of wllaceral reportS about these out·of-country CHICO M .forcc:s and the~r mis­ sion. W hen Si.l(int information became available. it evolved fi rst from crvpcologtc efforts in the field . <~C the · SPC and USASA u'nic ~ in Southeast Asia. Sigiot record of CFNVN evolution is available in man y Sig inc Produce reports in the CCM and C(J series . The era of J SPC concentration of CFNVN cornmu , nications was significant •n a number of areas : a. The cargec was of prirve concern to cop level intelligence cus tomers .and t herefore one on which any development of crypcologic success drew immediate atcenti{ln and frequent complimentary comment. h. It was a vastly complicated period durin~ whic h plans and accions. findings and interpreta tions required close coordina tion between the JSPC. SCA units and NSA production elements . c. Operating in essentially che same cime frame as all PACOM activities. the role of che JSPC became increasinj!ly more influential and autonomous .. d . Competition wich counterpart NSA elements led co conflicting opinions. frustration. and unilateral aetLOns on the pare of the JSPC. 11. Over two years of second.echelon experiimcc 'enabled che JSPC co cake immediate actions with tireless confidence in many areas of collection management. technical guidance and Siginc reporting. Often in the latter productS. a certain--almost clairvoyant- qua lity appeared. very much re miniscent of che extremely effec· · cive r'eporcing during the 1962-63 crises. f. Under pressure to develop and report each new · bit of informacion on CHICO M activity 1n :-.Iorch Viet · nam. and enchusiascicaJiy anxious co do so, the J SPC used its competitive esprit de 1 corps and well-coordi · nated, joint capabi lity to mount numerous studies and projects. The JSPC Charte r did n()( authorize many of these adventures. but ~enerally they received de facco sanctior because .. noching succeeds like success... Sue· cessful, timely actions were the rule rather chan the exception. TOP SECRET UMBRA 15 IE.O. 13526, section 3.3 (b )(6) Withheld from ______ ...:...___ ______ _ ____... _ _ _-·-..-------r-~l_i_ <:__~elea~~ --' Pub. L. 86-36 DOCID: 2909802 ~ .....,.._. ... TOP SECRiET UMBRA Co ncurrenr sun:esses in exploiting che radio commu ­ nications of CFNVN . Inter national Shipping into North Vietnam . and North Vietnamese Air and Air Defense units brought the JSPC to an unprecedented peak level of capability. Prestige and frequent kudos from customers gave the Center a feeling of omni· science. There were few who were willing to openlr challenge whar the )SPC said and did. . Ont major con­ test over the continued need for and efficacv of the JSPC ·developed in the 1965. earl y 1%6 period. with pro­ JSPC forces emerging the victors. Until the B Group Operational Review Group (ORG i of 1968 surfaced its critig ue of B Group-JSPC relationships. the Center continued as a fairly independent .vomx of crypto ­ Iogic ability and NSA influence in th~ Pacific Theater. Th e JSPCs efforts against CF!'I:VN communications continued through the period of withdrawal of CHI­ COM support units from North Vietnam . Exploitation emphasis shifted as CHICOM logistic and AAA units became increasingly active in Northern Laos during 1961-!. CHICOM construction of primary li nes of com · munications in northern and northwestern Laos had been alleged in collatera l materials since the late 1950s, although radio commu nications serving these activities had never been recovered and identified . With in­ creased North Vietnamese activity in Laos, radio com­ munications apparent! )' were established lor the com ­ plementary CHICOM construction effort . As these communications became available. )SPC established a specia I task force co ensure the same concentrated atten ­ . cion to their exploitation that had been ensured il) 1965 against CFNVN. By 1969 and 1970. CHICOM Forces Laos (CFL ) replaced CFNVN in importance. and a more coordinaued, less competitive, joinr Sigint effort · · was enjoyed by JSPC and B Group than had been present Juring . the earlier efforts against CFNVN communications . CFL remained a primary develop­ mental target through the last days of JSPC operation. A later section of this document focuses on the transfer of this and ocher functions from JSPC- 1 w B Group during the drawdown . ·rhe preceding are · but examples of the expanded efforts and involven:enrs that began in late summer of 1964 and continued until the last years ofJSPC's exist­ tnce . The fundamental point here is that the scheme of things at the JSPC had been baptized in the fire of two successive Rap periods in 1962 and 1963 and stood ready to respond commensurately with the onslaught of intelligence actions and activity that accompanied ex. panding U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Numerous additions and changes to the JSPC mission and organi­ zation occurred i n response w requirements of the era. 16 TOP SECRET UMBRA . Operational Review Group As early as 1965 the continuing need for the JSPC came under critical question within the NSA. Th is question ing was associated with planning for a modern ­ ization of collection and processing techniques. referred w alternately as the Far East Modernization Plan and PACEMAKER. By 1968 this g:uesrioning assumed a more articulate and visible form in the application of the modern management pract ice of organization and function appraisa l to mfasure the attainment of selected objectives by B Group and .the JSPC. Specifically , management appraisa l Chief of B Group and Review Group (O RG}. or c audit hartered was as inspired the Ope b)' rati rhe onal Purpose During August of 1968 the purpose and procedure of the ORG were announced. The group was co r<." view the overseas processing effort of .the JSPC in relation co that performed within B Group , to evaluate the effi­ ciency and economy of operations, and to measure optimum response to technical and consumer reguire­ mencs. More precisely. . the ORG was to : a. Evaluate the JSPC performance on B Group tar ­ gets against simila r performance at NSA . b. Consider what tasks and functions, if any, per ­ formed at the JSPC could better or more econom ically be performed at NSA or elsewhere . · t. ldencify any modifications t o the existing .oper· arions cycle on B Group ta'rgets which mighr be requ ired or desired. Withheld from Composition p ublic release Pub. L. 86-36 A group chairman, responsible only to the B Gr0up Chief. was selected. He was assisted on a full-time basis by representatives from participating offices. The Chairman was Mr. Delmar C. Lang, then Chief of B-05 . Other representatives to the group were: Mr. I I. B6 ; Mr. I I 84; Mr. B3; Mr . 82; Mr. Robert Galloway, B5 ; Mr. I I 81 ; Mr. 83; Mr. Thomas Newsome, 804. For eguity. J SPC provided the following repres~ntatives to the ORG: CDR Owen Englander, USN, JSPC-2; Mr. Arthur P. Garner , JSPC-05; Mr. John S. Sharp, JSPC-5 ; Major J ames W. Hun.t, USA. JSPC-04; Mr. Samuel Smart,JSPC-03 . DOCID : 2909802 T O P SECRET U MBRA that with the advent of AG-22 inputS via data links. tion via data link co NSA on a timely and accurate basis . and with the machines programmed w handle timely The O RG's findings later served as inputs to the blue ­ data at NSA. the principal raison d'etre for a JSPC print for che JSPC drawdown, discussed later in chis would no longer exi st. Indeed. test evidence showed document . that field units could collect and forward total collec. . I ":FOP S~CJt£T UAIBRA 19 .. . · DOCID : 2909802 TOP SECRET U MBR ,\ IV. The Last Years The lase cwo or three )'tars of the JSPCs exiscence can be described variously. They were years of maturity in applying lessons learned , years of gradually waning pressures on all elements of the (enter except che Air ~ivision , and they might be ~st descri~d as simply what they most certainly were- hectic. final years. When the B Group Operational Review Group (O RG ) departed, it left · a legacy of unprecedented introspec­ tion. This introspection tended to soften the hard lines of autonomous · actions, and it made managers and analyst alike more aware nf the need to work with. rather chan apart from. their counterparts at NSA. As rumors of drawing down or closing out the JSPC ap­ peared to be less rumor chan imminent reality, some of the earlier dynamism and aggressiveness of the work force began to fade. These impressions are not to imply chat motivation and quality of action were lacking during chis period .· Those who cared the most and worked the hardest-­ that type of person the JSPC seemed always and abun ­ dantly blessed with. even to develop-these profes­ - sionals continued their efforts . But that long-present s~rise of urgency was fading. ~\owly but inexorably. and everyone was aware that it was. Fewer and fe wer ..----, persons could be found at work on weekends and after hours. The targets no longer presented quite the same challenge. The impact on the Center of the scope and tempo of U.S. operations in Southeast Asia was chang. ing.l I attention seemed to ~ shifting to the USSR and its strengthening of forces alon~: the Sino­ Soviet borders . The C~ltural Revolution had passed in '-----' Communist China, and in its aftermath there was none of the same potentiall y threatening anti. U.S. activity that had preceded the re~ol ution . Watchfu lness . over target communica tions con ­ tinued , and even minor aberations were viewed with studied suspicion . But except for the new and concen­ trated efforts at the JSPC on North Vietnamese Gener~l Directorate of Rear Service (GD RS) communicat ions, and the flurry of cryptologic actions followi ng the loss of che Pueblo and the shootdown of the EC-121, mosc elements of the Center conducted business as usual. Nearly all of che challenge the JSPC faced during the last few years was cente red in JSPC-3. the Air Division, where GDRS and ESDS demands prevailed even imo the drawdown era, and where the JSPC involvement wirh G O RS was co outlive the Center as a responsibility ofNRRYU. . Thus the record of. the last years is a record largely of JS PCs role in supporting the Pertpheral Air Recon ­ naissance Program (PARPRO ) and the CINCPAC COM MANDO MERCURY program of protecting the PAR PRO. ESDS to PARPRO The I 5 April 1969 Norch Korean shootdown of a U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft triggered re­ examination of the U.S. world-wide aerial reconnais­ sance program . For approximately nine months there­ after, JSPC played a primary role in the Pacific Theater as a focal point for cryprologic support w the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO}. The experience proved co be both traumatic and trium­ phant. By I<) April JCS had directed a review of all data obtaiqed from airborne collection platforms . In re­ sponse, NSA ~gan to collect p recise data on each mis­ sion, the value or uniqueness of the data each mission produced (as compared with ground -based sites) and the potential frequency and priority of each mission. Concurrently. and of immediate concern. was che protection of scheduled aerial missions . U.S. air and. naval forces were on full alert during the weeks that fol­ lowed che shootdown, and although a number of mis­ sions were cancelled. specific fighter caps were com­ mi tted to protect the most important missions. Thus. while the problem of providing sustained support and a reliable potential for protective cover to ACRP mis­ sions was being developed. the valuable ACRP program was maintained al~it at a greatly reduced level. The necessity for aarborne cnllection was reaffirmed.. The fundamental question was one of .. risk versus results. .. h was evident tha t protection f<lr reconnais­ sance Aights into sensitive areas required more coordi­ nation between the Sigint community and pro tective opera tiona I forces . By 22 April it had been determined that protection of all reconnaissance programs under the existi ng PARPRO was beyond the capability of cheater r!!· sources. Under hi; Phase I protection plans, C!NC · I TOP S~CRET U MBRA 2 1 - -·- -·--- - .. -·-- ·--- - --- ~-·- ·--- - ·-. DOCID: 2909802 'fOP SECRET UMBRA PAC suggested to JCS that full PARPRO schedules should not be resumed unci! nationa l level considera­ tion had been given to the program. Re<ju ired fighter and tanker support. GCI radar augmentation, use of carrier cask groups with a sdf-contai11ed GCI capabi l­ ity. and o ther anci llary re<Juirements being considered, it seemed that there was no economical wa}' to provide pr(ltection to PARPR O aircraft along 2.000 miles of the China coast. While J CS, PACAF and CJNCPAC developed and coordinated their operationa l plans (OPLANs) . the .JSPC and NSAPAC Office Japan coordinated on a message to 5AF/USFJ addressing the need for Sigint sitts co receive timely operational information on U.S. Air Force and Naval actions to protec t PARPRO mis­ sions over the Sea of J apan . This joint message stressed tht need for fighter time of launch and rendezvous points to be disseminated to Sigint sites and to the JS PC on the most timely basis possible. Timely receipt of operational reports (O PREPs) had already proved vital to . the combined response of Sigint sites and the .JSPC throughout the air war in Southeast Asia. Their principal value was that o £ guidance to the cryptologic task of concentrating attention and resources on certain targets and areas at important times. Clearly. simi lar mformation was vital to any success the cryptologic community wo uld have in supporting the PARPRO program . By early Ma y the JCS had decreed that PARPRO missions could not lly close r than SO nautical miles to the Soviet, North Korean and Chinese coastlines and that in some areas, fi,l!hter protection was mandatory . A new Condition Four warning line was therefore established. Fighter escorts were required for all recon ­ naissance Aights within sensitive areas over the Sea of Japan. while other missions depended upon strip altrt forces for protection. B)· the end of May PACAF Operations Plans 103-YR and 106:-YR had been validated and respectively defined operationa l concepts and CAP /SAR support requirements for PARPRO activi ty along the Soviet , North Korean and Chinese peripheries in the PACOM area. Protection of these missions was to rely upon early warning radar infor­ mation and fighters on scrip a lens as available from: tJ . A lJ .S. Navy CG J picket ship off the coast of North Korea . b. Task Force 71 forces i n the Yellow Sea. c. Strip a lerc posture for fighters at Misawa , Japan. and at va rious bases in South Korea, and soon there ­ aft er, figh ters based on Okinawa and Taiwan. As these OPLANS were implemented , Command Advisorr Functions (CAFs) were activated at Osan Air Base. South Korea (3 14 Air Division/5th Air Force 22 TOP SECRET UMBRA ADVON ), Naha Air Base. Okinawa OUth Air Di ­ vision/51st Tactical Fi~hrer lntercepwr WinJ: l. Taipei Air Stat ion. Taiwan (_~27th Air Division ) and Clark AFB. Philippines ( I )th Air Force ). These CAFs were to receive and acr upon informati on penaining to PARPRO missions and a~ required . direct protective actions. Sigint was preem inently important to the suc­ cess of the CAF mission. In grossl)· over-simplified terms . the plans for crypto­ logic support stated that Sigint sites would pass inter­ cepted reflections of PARPRO missions to the CAF in that site's immediate area . Conceptuall y sound as it '?'as. fulfillment of th is requirement posed a challenge. PARPRO missions typicall v drew reactions from tar,get communications as the miSSiOn pr<)~ressed . Since the missions of Si~int sites were tar~et <irienred and largely determined by hearabi lity and ~rganization of the target , more than one SiJ!inr site would obtain reflec­ tions of a PARPRO mission --reflections of value to a CAF in an arta <llher than the one in which the site was located . Rap1d movement of this information to the concerned C:AF was essential but not feasible via nor­ mal CRJTICOMM channels because direct lateral communications between Si tes did not then exist and ' standard traffic routes were wo slow. With implementation of the USAF CAF system . a .separate, secure comcnumcatiun~ syst~m was planned to li nk each CAF with its headquarters and with appropri ­ ate Sigim units. Since this systt~m was not tmrnediarelv available. however_ the rryptologir wmmunity was called upon for interim assistance_. The most obvious action was for the JSPC to serve as the focal point for all PA RPRO related Sigint and to ensure delivery of that information to appropriate CAFs. Since the JSPC maintained direct OPSCO MM circuits with all USAFSS sites. the~e circuits would enable the J SPC to rewve. filter and relay PARPRO-related Sigint to the lJSAFSS site closest to the CAF most concerned. The useability of OPSCOMM circuits was not <juestion­ ed, but thei; use for this rela y pu~pose. precluded their use for the informa l analyst-to-analyst exchanges · for which ·the ci rcuits had been obraintd . The CAF:s first re­ quired one plot every minute on the location of the PAR­ PRO mission as shown in intercepted tar_Ret communica­ tions. Thus during a mission. the flight following and data forwarding requirement wok precedence over any other OPSCOMM usc. The first timely Right folluwin.R provided to the CAF system was on.._--:---=----!. I Iof 14 J une over the Yellow Sea. Because of irs route from Korea to Taiwan. it provided considerable initial insi}!ht into the naiUre of the challen,ee o f provid­ ing timely Si~i nt service. 0 ~ E.O. 13526, sec tion 3.3(b)(3) DOCID: 2909802 Withheld from public release Pub. L. 86-36 fi1rwarded to Japan . After some coordination problems tvpies of the Onna Point package were re-subm itted by JSPC wall cvncerned in early March 197 I . Drawdown T he fa te nf the J oi nt Sobe Processinx Center was trul v scaled on th e 20 th of February I 970 when the Chief Colonel Grardon K. Eubank, USAF. and the Depu ty ( 'hitf. l I rt: reived Bravu Group tele ­ m n Item Nr . 07, Subject : Preliminary Draft of Plan for Real ijtnment of JSPC. Prom that time on, planninA wen forward and the J oi nt Sobe Processing Center drew down efficiently and rapid ly hetween June 19 70 and July 197 1. The initial drawdown timetables were developed hv office chiefs and subelement managers within NSA :ond forwarded to JSPC. Therea fter. the management anJ operation of drawdown procedures resulted from frequent 1nceranio n between the J SPC divisions and staffs and their counterparts at NSA. The s ucces.~ of the drawdo... n mea~ured in terms of conti nuity of action. was a direct rt•sulr of the factors listed below. a. Dra wdown managcmcnt was exercised hy subelt:· menr managers at NSA and division chie fs at J SPC. r;Hher than a strong central or neutra l authority; b. Tasks and resptmslbili ties were tra nsfer red after the receiving element demonstrated the abi lity to perform and accept them: c. Lis<- of a llc:xrble timetab le, ra ther than a rixid ont. 1nsured thai tasks would not be transferred prematurel y; and. most important!)•. d. NSA and JSPC personnel worked co~ether w achieve optimum draw -dow n results. Subelement ma na~emenr of the drawdown proved a key part of the drawdown. By separating drawdown ac ­ tion~ bv subelement . NSA allowed JSPC divisions and bra nch~s w actively participat~ in, and accept as a goal, cuch d rawdown action. Th us, th e subelemcnt mana~e­ ment comrnl approach engaged the very people wht> might nm have otherwi se felt so personall y and deeply 1nvolved . and ensu red the success of the o peration . B~:cause· the. directi on and control v£ the JSPC.: draw. J .,wn was subelement stru ctu red. detai led descriptions uf rhe drawdown will be by JSPC di vision/staffs in order that each drawdown action descri bed can be relau~d 1m mediate ly to adjacent actions. Ground Forces Division Alt hough tentatively schedu led tO begin during Octo· ber 1970. the dra wdown of the I I L.....______, JSPC- 1, actu:llly began during Decem­ - --- - --- - -·-·· TOP SECRET UMBRA . · r ; . t I I to counterpart 821 elements. JSPC- 13 ceased operations on I 5 December . . . In addi tiM. 821 assumed responsibi li ty for the publt cation of theI I ­ The return of chis' weekly summary tu 8 2 1 during Pha~e I required that JSPC-1 provide intelligc:~c~ item.s: v1a OPSCOMM, to 8 21 concerni ng the1rem:11mng mrhca? regions and entities still under JSt'C's purv iew. T hts procedure continued until Phase 111. th e final .phase of the JSPC- 1 drawdown , was implemented dur rng May 1971. Phase II. elCecuted on schedule dur ing March and April 197 I , consisted of the return of processi~~ and reporti ng resp<msibilites as welt as T EXT A authomy and CMA for the I I I USPC-12. the clement pr~vi . ously tasked with those responsibilities. ceased operatr on during April. Phase III began on I May 1971 and continued as scheduled through 15 June. This phase involved ~he transfer to USM- 3 ofJSPC- 11 's first echelon processrn~ and report ins and sundry tasks of thq , I 1 /together With per­ son nd . To an:omplt sh thl~ . the f() lowing . steps were taken: a. In early May, rhe JSP(- 14 voice processi n~ effort was merged wnh JSPC- ll ; b . In mid -Ma y. the JSPC- 105 Reporting Sea~ pre ­ pared JSPC- 1 1 analy sts and reptJrters. f?~ ~ssumptron on. 1 June of autonomous P and R r!!spon~lbtlltles at USM-3. c. Also in mid-May, JSPC-11 assumed data-base maintenance tasks fromJSPC- 5, and : d. Between 1 and 14June.JSPC- l l personnel physi· oily relocated to USM- 3 spaces. TOP SECRET UMBRA 15 E.O. .13526, section 3.3(b)(3) W ithhe ld "from public release Pub. L. 86-36 i . I. : :,- .. ~ . ' I.' j; . '\• . ':•·. 1.. ... - ... genera y cotnCt e an s are a Withheld from -t----- ­ public release Pub. L. 86-36 -1 I was I E.O . 13526, sec tion 3.3(b)(3) R5iC~iE-f3~8N..P2 Th e NSA civilian Deputy Chief of JSPC attached co USM-3 as a technica l representative of 821. TEXTA and CMA au thorities for the enti ties abso rbed by US M- 3 were returned to NSA during Ma)' l971. With the transfer of JSPC- I I co USM- 3. JSPC-1 ceased to function. Th e staff organizations of JSPC­ 102/103/104/105 and the Office of the Chief, JSPC­ 1 were deactivated. T he second echelon processin~ and reporting functions of JSPC-1 had been relinquished co NSA ( 8 21) . Navy Divisi on ..._,._...,....J l t: sche ule or the drawdown. however. was developed by JSPC-2 and received NSA 's apprilV al du ring July 1970. According to this schedule, the drawdown would begin du ring August 1970 and con ­ tinue to fruition in July 1971. NSA's major consider ­ arion was the augmentation of the processi ng and reportin~ resuurces within 8 22 prior co completion of the phase-out. 8 22 estimated that 35 additional analysts and technicians would be needed: the JSPC- 2 plan provided for the staggered transfer of 23 JSPC- 2 per~onnel to 8 22 to help meet that requ irement. Although onginally begun as a separate act ion. the return of second echelun repor ting tasks for comrnf.ln cause with the officia l dra wdown. This phase­ out pla nning, therefore, was incorpora ted into the olfKial drawdow n planning for the whole center . The transfer began during May 1970: NSA (G7) ass umed responsibi lity for reporti ng on I I I NSA (85 1) began publication of the L--------...1 L------------' during June . The official drawdown began on schedule during Aug ust : NSA !851) assumed publication of the I I I I Summary on the 14th. The final portion of JSPC-24 re ­ sponsibilities was t ransferred to NSA {851 ) lurinj Januar)' 1971. 8 51 began publication of the I Ion 1 January . JSPC-24 was deaCtivated on that date. 26 TOP SECRET UMBRA Drawdown planning for ph.1se-nut of processinlt and reporting of JSPC- 2's I I called for the transfer of all such secund echelon re ­ sponsibilities to ~SA (B22J and for the establ tshment of a first echelon P and R effort I I Second Echelon Processiflf_ ,md Repo rting 8 22 took over second echdon J>rqcessing and Re. porting tasks on the I I L-------------::--:::--::--' duri ng October I 9 7 0 . ·And in December, JSPC-212 relinquished to 822 its P and R responsibilities fori I L----:---:--' JSP C-2 12, however, continued tO moni­ tor NSF developments unti l mid-April to allow for the suhmissio n of intell i gt:nr~ items to JSPC- 0'> for entry in the USF-790 Daily Sigint Summary . During January 197 t, JSPC-2 returned w 822, TEXTA and colleetiun management authori ties for all ent ities except those of the I Iw htch were returned during May. Alsu in May. JSPC- 2 t urned over to 822 second echelon P and R responsi­ bilities for I I The second echelon processing and reporting effort againstOcommunica tions wJs assumed by B22 dur· in~June 1971 Fim Echelon Pmcessiflg and Reporting In preparation for I I assumption of first echelon Processing and Reporting tasks for c=J I I by l January 1971. JSPC-2 transferred ana lys ts and repor ters w I I between September and December ~·970. allocated spare wi thin the: JSPC-2 area and gat hered equipm ent for I Iuse. Th e newly. formed Processing and Re porting Division began operation as scheduled on I January 1971 The P and R ,Divtsion assumed the additional tasks of transcri bing. anal}· ziog and report­ ing ACRP intercept o£ 1 I communications during Febru:~ry . In April, (SPC-2I transferred the task of preparing STRUM on I I The drawdown of JS PC-2 was m mpleted by mtd ­ June. slightly ahead of schedule. During the early dra wdo wn planning sta,..g..._e_s._ N_S_A..., envisioned a residual effort at ISPC against I I L---------------------------'1 A I E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(3) Withheld from ~llb1ic-re1eas"e · Pub. L. 86-36 Withheld fromI E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(3) public release DOCID: 2909802 P ub. L. 86-36 minimum of 188 analytic and reporting billets were to remain in a current operations unit . As the drawdown ~rogressed. however, this direction was changed in lavor of a complete drawdown of the Air Division . hen though formal planning for the JSPC-3 draw . dnwn was slow to develop, the phaseout of chis division was the first to begin and the first to be completed. North VietnameJe Air/Air Defeme During August 1970, JSPC-31, che North Viet· namese Air/Air Defense Branch, ceased publication of the North Vietnamese Radar Summary (N RS}_. Begin· ninJ: on 18 August, NRS highlights were included in the NAS (North Vietnamese Air Summary) . NSA ( 1331 ) did not continue w p ublish the NRS. JSPC-31 relinquished collection management and TEXTA authori ties and technical suppon casks for VCA/V/T (.'ommunicacions co B3l on l September. B3I assumed data.base maintenance for all NVN Air/Air Defense entities during November. JSPC-31 cryptanalytic casks for the Air Surveillance. SAM/AAA and remaining entities were transferred during November 1970, December 1970 and January 1971. Also during Janu· .H)' . 831 assumed responsibility for the NVN SAM/ MI(; Disposition of Forces effort. JS~C- 31 published che last NAS on 28 February; 1331 began publishing it on 1· March . Before assuming thac responsibility, 831 tech-phased che report in irs final weeks; JSPC-31 reporters, assisted by the JSPC­ 3 Reconnaissance Specialist and the JSPC-05 Senior Reporter. prepared the NAS and reviewed NSA cech­ phasin~ inputs. Simultaneously, USA-522 . began publica tion of che Missioo Results Technical Sum­ mary (MRTS) under the tutelage of JSP<.:- 31 analysts. 133 I assumed responsibility for the remaining P and R tasks on 1 March. rhus bringing J SPC-31 operations ru ~ close. The Chief. JSPC-3 I, remained with USA­ '>22 in the ensuing months co assist in its newly formed P and R effort. TOP SECRET UMBRA The .___________ ___JJSPC-32. by transferring the responsibilit~· L------------....J to B32 and B33. as appropriate, on 15 August 1970. On the: 30th, the Weekly Inter -airfield Flight Summary (containing a recapitulation for NSA and c:::::J of all inter-airfield flight activities not reported in product ) was assumed by B32 . On l September JSPC-32 transferred to 8 32 and B33. appropriately. tht: responsibility for main­ taining the Technical Radar Order-of-Battle. and data hase maintenance o( the ~forementioned entities­ including the Bomber and Fi,ghter entities. On che same da te · . jSPC-32' crrpranalyri c efforrs on the arr suf\·eillance problem were relinquished to B34 on I December; 834 assumed che remainder on I Januar y 1971. On I February, JSPC-32 transferred its CHUR<.:HDOOR intercept processing responsibility to USA-6<.>. 633 assumed responsibilities. for the Bomber and T·ransport DASUMs on 15 February and che re mainder of JSP<.:­ 32's P and R effort on I March ; JSPC -32s operation ceased. ReconnaiJJance Reporring JSPC-36. the Current Operocions 13ran(.'h. and JS PC- 31 performed all reconnaissance (RECON l re­ action reporting tasks within the JSPC. JSPC-31 re poned on BUFFALO HUNTER/BELfRY EXPRESS missions;JS PC-36 reponed on all mhers. The drawdown of reconna issance reporting be!!an in July wich the return cc> NSA ( 835 ) of 72-hour wrap· up reporting on G IANT SCALE. GIAN T NAIL. CHURC HDOOR and selected BEGGAR SHADOW and BENCH ROYAL missions . Hy I Sep_tember. only Bl.I FFALO HUl\'TER/BEL· FRY EXPRESS reportin~ missions remained . Those were returned to 83 5 on I March 1971. JSPC-36 also was tasked with Sigint Direct Service tasking and time­ ly reconnaissance support. These responsibi lities. ex­ . cepe timely support co OL- RK at Kadena Air Base (GIANT SCALE flight following ) . were recur'ned co NSA (835 ) on 8 Februarr 1971. 8.35 assumed the G IANT SCALE flight foll~win~ responsibility on the 17th. T he O PSCOMM circuits under che control of JSPC- 36 were relinquished to NRRYU on l March 1971. and jSPc..: 36 ceased all operations. TOP SECRET UMBRA 27 IE .O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(3) ·-Witlth~difrem- - -­ public r elea se Pub. L. 86-36 DOCID: 2909802 TOP SECRET UMBRl.. V . To Be Remembered The JS PC's ten year history was marked by innumer­ able projects and situations that seem best remembered outside the context of any particular period . Artacking these challenges. and the many others for which scantv information !las survived. was the work-a -d ay world of the Center and the thousands who served it over the dtcacie . Housing The provision of quaners for NSA l'ivilian personnd assigned to JSPC was a controversial issue even before th e Center officially opened. a nd the subject remained to some extent a recurring and controversial one through . out the Center's l 0 year history. As ear!y as May 196!, NSA. through DOD. inquired abclUI govern~ent quarters for J SPC civilian personnel. The OA responded that there existed on O kinawa a seri­ ou' dependent housing shortage and recommended that NS A program for construCtion of its own housing . On 25 Au~ust 1961. in a Me morandum for the Secreta ry of Dtfense. NSA requested that 33 houses be incorporated in the DOD World- Wide Family Housing Program as .. separate. extra-service, DOD requirements ... The mem ­ orandum stipulated that .. When constructed , this housing \h<•uld be under the assignment cont rol of the National Security A}(ency. but otherwise should be administered and logistically supporte~ by the Department of the Anny : · The: NSA request was approved by DOD and sub­ se4uendy included in an appropriations bill approved by Congress. The houses were bui lt and provision was made for occupancy by JSPC civilian personnel. These provi­ sions for occupancy were never forgotten by many JSPC per~onnel over the years because the agreement allowed intej!ration of 33 modern and comfortable NSA-funded houses with older. appreciably Jess comfortable Army housin~. Preferential treatment for 33 NSA families was speci­ fied in the· agreement . but speci fie eligibi lity for quarters was to be determined b)' the USARYIS. Thus the 33 sets o f new quarters , all of which were three and four bedroom houses With central air conditi oning and electric laun­ dry. were turned over to USA RYIS for allocatio n. Thirty-three famil ies were to get almost immediate oc­ cupancy after arnv1ng on Okinawa. but grade criteria including bedroom requirements were to be determined bv the Army. few NSA civilian personnel ever lived in the new quarters, alt hough many ranking Army people immensely enjoyed them . Further . and because for years lr SARY!S chose to ignore the DOD mi litary-civilian e4uivalency rating scale. many G5-12s were considered w be "company grade"' and therefor.e {eceived compan}' grade quarters which were ~rnssly inadequate for some families. When NSA obtained the 33 sets of family quarters, the number was considered adequate to accommodate the amicipated civilian population of the Center. In"· a few years. however. the civilian population increased w over 60 with a concurrent need for more ~overnment housi ng. JSPC stated its requirement for up w 18 additiona l sets of quarters. On 4 December 1963. DIRNSA reported that the 65-6<J external support requirements had been appruved by the Militaq· Department who had then in­ formed the Assistant Secretary of Defense that every effort would be made to supply che required support. The NSA reql\irernen t for JSPC civilian personnel for FY 66-70 that was forwarded to the DA inciuded the original 33 sets of family quarters. with occupancy priority co be determined bv the Chief ofJSPC. and additional fam ily quarters, as necessary. in accordance with lo<:al com­ mand policy {estimated as 18 a<lditional sets of quan<·rs l. On 7June 1965. DIRNSA stated chat ASD had advised that the FY 6(J-70 external supp\Jrt requirements. had been approved and that an)' local a~reement should be based on the document published . even thouj!h US ARY IS might not be in possession of DA apprqval. G-4 USAR­ YIS, however, would not accept these additional require­ mentS unless specifically advisee! to do so by ASD/DA. A long series of meetin~s and exchanges of memoranda ensued, through out which JSPC restated its requirement for access to 18 additional sees of government quarters . USARYIS was always sympathetic with the requ irer;1ent, bu t refused to accept the responsibility. The issue finally was settled on 6 Marth J967 when the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in a mc:morandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Logistics) dis­ approved the latter's request to suspend the requirement for the DA co provide 18 additional sets of quarters. Thereafter, USARYIS honored the JSPC requirement TOP SECRET UMBKA 31 .,. ~::*ll ~ -- .. .. • ~·. , . . ....... . . . . . ~. ' 1 DOCID: 2909802 TOP SECRET UMBRA and a subsequent External Support agreement between USARYIS and JSPC provided for the civilian personnel of the JSPC to have access to a maximum of 51 sets of quarters. . . Access to Army quarters for )SPC personnel remained throughout the 10 years on the same basis as all other eligible persons. Most JSPCers - like their military coun­ ter pam- were faced with the necessity to purchase wash­ ers. dryers . and air conditioners at considerable personal expen~. The bitterness that wme NSA ..company grade·· civil ­ ians developed did not contribute constructively to their wur on Okinawa. Their feeling was that the discrimina­ tory situation could have been astutely avoided by NSA management during the formulation of the initial hous­ in~ agreement. That chis view has merit is a matter of opi nion . Final judgment should consider that during the early months of JSPCs existence, the relatively sudden influx of an additional complement of civilians did not help an alread)· over-taxed housing situation. United States forces on Okinawa were expanding at a race dis­ proportionate to the construction of facilities to house and service them. In this environment, and recognizing that in truth NSA civilians ·were no more deserving of special treatment than were the military people, it mi~ht have proved irreversibly provocative and impolitic at minimum tO have demanded a different set of rules for the 'housing of NSA civilians. What the riew JSPC needed most was USARYISs· cooperation with numerous support · needs, and both NSA and JSPC management involved in the onginal housi~g agreement with USARYIS were keenly aware of the need to ~:ive and take. lt does appear that some over-acquiescence to USARYIS occurred, and that. for ex.1mple, JSPC might easily have obtained its own community of houses from USARYIS without too many ill feelings or other disadvantaJte. But. again, ~his is a matter of opinion; the fact remains that USARYIS af­ forded treatment to NSA civilians no less in quality than it afforded the military familie~ under its jurisdiction . . ·and only a few JSPC civilian families ever were .~ubjected to hardship other than financial as a result of the initial housing agreement . Those who were. had unquestionable reason to be di)pleased . It was less than fully enjoyable for a famil r of six to survive a tour with two bedrooms. External Support The establishment of an NSA field .acrivity with the mission and si?.e of the JSPC and !j() far from home base at Ft. Meade meant that substaotiallo~istic support would have to be provided by various military departments and ocher DOD agencies on Okinawa . On 7 April 1961. be­ fore the open!ng of the Center. the Assistant to the Secre­ tary of Defense for Special Operations sent a memoran ­ dum to the Service Secretaries, the Assistant Secretary of Defen~ (Comptroller). the Directors of the Defense Communications Agency and the Armed Forces Courier Service. concerning non -reimbursable support provided to NSA by the military departments and DOD agencies. The following portion of that memorandum subsequently served as a basis for establishing external support for the JSPC : The military departments and DOD agencies will ptovtd~ all types of support to the National Security Agency on a nonreim­ buruble basis. Any exCtfl(ion to this policy muSt !:It mutually accepcable to all parti~ concertlfd . On 19 January 1962, with operational ac(ivation of the JSPC imminent, the Department of the Army sent to CINCUSARPAC. for relay co USARYIS. a message containing the following statement : An Aerial View ofJSPC Compound 32 TOP SECRET UM8JtA DOCID : 2909802 I E .O. 13526, section 3.3(b )(3) Withheld from '- ­ public r elease TOP SECR ET U~fBRAPub . L. 86-36 OSD has d~signat~d DA to provid~ adminimalivt and logJs­ tical suppon to Joint SOOt l'rocusing (tnt~r (JSPC and compo­ nents ) To facilitate OA scaffing request advi~ by 24 Jan 62 on status of USARY IS Program .and Bud8tt for JSPC for FY62 and 6). Jd~ntify manpower, cost appropriation program and/or projtei financ~d or unlinanced. USARYIS had not pmgr.ammed to support the JSPC and in response estimared rhe roral cost of support to be $ 210 ,000 for the five · remai ning rnomhs of FY62 and $ ~00.000 for FY63. ·uSARYIS also advised DA that the FY62 requirements were not financed in the USAR­ y IS Budget. Available r~cords dll nm off~r precise in ­ si,cht into what resulted from this USARYIS response; however. support to JSPC commenced with operational anivation of the Center on I February l 962. Thus it is inferreJ that DA either accepted financial responsibi lit}' for the · FY62 costs or some arrangement was made for NSA reimbursem*nt. The e:uliest available lnrer-Service Supporr Agrt:e· menr CISSA) between JSPC and USARYJS is dated effective I July 1965 and signed by the Chief, JSPC, and the Assistant Chief of Scaff, USARYIS . That agreem~nt. like ics successors, delineated in generalities and speci­ fics the responsibilities of the parties to che agreement . The~ lst U.S. Army Security Agency Special Operations Command is included as a party to the agreement, but not a signatory. T he inclusion of the 51st SOC and its succe~S()r USASAFS. Sobe, in support agreemenrs be­ tween JSPC and USA~YIS re~ulced from an arrange­ ment between che cwo Army commands wherein USASAFS. Sobe, would act as an agent for USARYIS, ~ince certain requirements of che JSPC could best be met b)· the colloca ted field station . Examples were the instal- · lacion. operation and maintenance of telephones and the physical security of the JSPC operations area . The interjection. of the Fit:ld Station as an agent sub­ seq uencly led to an ISSA between that command and JSPC in 1965 . These agreements specifically stated that all funding arrangements were the responsibility of USARY IS and theJSPC. In FY68 , the ISSA with USARYIS became a tripar­ ritt aweeme,nt when, because of a realignment of Army mi)sions on Okinawa. the USASTRATCOM Signal Group . Okinawa, assumed responsibility for commu­ nications support . Typical of the costs involved in the support provid~d by USARYIS is the following budget estimate for f Y6S: Maintenance and Repair Facility Uti lities Custodial Services Family Housing Bachelor Quarters Transportation Support Supplies _ Ocher Jnstallacion Suppon Functions TOTA L: $30.000 55,000 72.000 24,800 4.800 16.000 200.000 26,600 $4 29.200 Except for assisting USARYIS in planning for the supply fund ing. the JSPC did not participate in budget programming for these categori es. In addition co che support afrangemencs b~tween the JSPC, USARYIS and Field . Station 1 Sobe. the Cencer also received suppor.t from the U.S. Naval Security G roup Activity, Okinawa, in the form of Building 305. and the services for its upkeep , at Futenma, Okinawa. This support was documented by letters of understanding between the Commanding Officer. U.S. NSGA. Okina­ wa. and Chief. JSPC. One letter dated May I 964 lists the foll;>wing com for this support : Electricit)' B.ooo.oo Water 25.00 Repair and Upkeep 50.00 Guards 3.000.00 As part of che I Iprol(ram for the collection and processing of data from the communications satellite system, an NSA study of possible I Iiocercept sites indicated .that Okinawa was one of the several pos­ sible prime inrercepc locations. The JSPC was informed of the results of this study in May . 1967 . NSA re<juesced that J SPC explore the possibility of obtaining 15-20 acres of land for use as an intercept site, and investiRate the feasibi lity of locating some 250-3bO civi lian person· nel to man the facility. Discussions were conducted wich local military or}:anizations and the requisite information was forwarded. · In December 1966 JSPC learned chat the Government of Japan (GOJ ) had surveyed several sites on Okinawa with a view towards establishing a satellite trackin~ station . One of the GOJ site~ was in the vicinity of a proposed I I site at Onna Point. 1t was later IE.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(3) Wit hh eld fro m ,p ubli c rele a se Pub. L. 86-36 TOP SECRET UMBRA 33 .. _ .<M---""' . • rards ~r month. ELFJ and ELFAIR discriminants were used b~· the local Okinawa CRITICOMM ~ration , CRS-0. to select and route materia ls coming in from ! ISASA and USAFSS sites w JSPC-5 . where seven n·perfor ators were avail able for around-t he-clock optr· ation . Model I 903 paper tape reader equipment used b)• JSPC-5 enabled conversion to magnetic ra pe at a rate of '> 00 characters per second for subsequent computer manipulati on and production of analy~t s' listings. These first twt> programs were faster and more efficient t han anything existing previousl y at pACOM Sigi nt units. EDPM capabi litie.~ at the new JSPC supported a t,rpt of second echelon analysis never before possible in the theater . By 1%3. El.FI had heen irnproved as REDELfi­ Reduced Electrical Forwarding Instructions - and re. qui red only a one -time punch of indicative information ttl SC::A uni tS. T his rmprovemcnr red uced punch time and ~roupage at the sites in fa vor of a computer expan . sion to the original for mat during loading of the ana· lytrc data at the J SPC. After two years of activity , an IBM I 460 system replaced one IBM 140 I w enable faster and more Aex­ rhle computer operat ions. The new 1460 used existin~ I·iO l programs . The two systems were operat~d at an average of 500 hours each per month and continued as the basit: JSPC-S da ta handling system until the su m. mer of 19G7 . Late in 1965 and e·arl y in I 966. NSA implemented a stand~rdized data record ing format for crypwlogi c u~c world -wide called STRUM-Standard Techn ical Report Using Mod ules (ref. TECHINS No. 1022) . M Initially. B Group stated tha t unless C G rou p cou ld :;;: provide immedia te programs to handle th is new fo rmat, ~ cha nge to the STRUM program could not be made on l"'ic: 8 Group (and JSPC) problems. After much delibe ration .~ of req ui rement s, and sornt tn evitable compromise · be­ ~ tween JSPC. B and C Groups, C Group modified ~ STRUM as Fixed Fteld (FF) STRUM and provided..:; M the program support required by H Group. JSPC person­ ~ ne-1 partici pated in the development of software to pro. ..-~ duce for matted records from FF STRUM . When imple ­ 0 me n ted at the JSPC and related SCA units in Septern ber ~ J<J66, Ff STRUM applied only to I I -.------, I land 'proved to be highly flexible in § ~ ~ manipulati~g items of technica l informatit' n on these: .:: ~ .,c targets. :!:! ~ OC: Development of a responsive, ever-improving data ~ ~ -: hand ling capability at the JSP C became a reality early ; .g .g in the Center's history. b ut from the beginning, it was ::;: c. Q. obvious that many man hours were wasted and jobs were delayed or slow to develop ; improvements clearly were needed. Early in the opera tion, the time -consum . 36 TOP SECRET UMBRA ing handl inx of paper tapes was reco~niled as one of the more necessary aspects of the E DPM system. and wa ys of rnini mi~ing this problem were constantly searched t<~r . Paper tape was the medium th rou~h which about 90% of all data Wll) rcn:ived for machi m· pruces· sing . . Nearly all (a pproxima tel y 98% ) incoming da ta for machine processing was rece1vtJ electrica ll y each da )· in the form of about 500 messages representing some 3 7 different report types from 30 SCA si tes. The paper tapes had tO be tor n at the end of each rnessa~e. ma nually identified . logged. sorted by report type and ori~inawr. spliced and reeled. Thi.~ was fo llowed hy load of paper tapes on map.neric tape .and the prpJuction of error list · inp.s of the loaded J ata for each of 19 different jobs. Complete machine set up was required for each. as was operator kn()wledge of as many different setS of pro( t.' · durc:s. Simpldication of these steps wa~ one of the ea rli · est examples of JSPC- 'i ingenuity and t~·pi cal of many similar actions throughout the Center's data pro(·essinp. hr . swry. I Work in!( with salvaged equipment. JSP<.-5 de· sig ned and had fabricated ta pe winders that could a utomatically reel the paper rape emer~rn~ from the seven tape ~dorators in the Centtr's Auwmatir Drs­ tribution (onrrol Center IADCC)- an operat ion sinH· Jar co that of· NSA ADP ' s. These const•lidated rapes were loaded on magnetic tape by one machine pm)o\ram tha t automati cally · ide ntified and Ragged incomin~ messages by report type and originator . sequenced the rnessages by- type. then error- listed messap.es hy wm. puter job. This overall process was called AUTO· MATE and went into effe<:t in 1966 ; the c;oODTJME program of a later date replaced AUTOMATE. Ali· TOMATE eliminated manual fu nctions requi nn~ about 480 man hours each week. It simplified o~rator tra ining and error , and it made acc~s to new pro p. rams and their products easier and faster for the ana· lyses of the Center . Further exr.ansion of capabil ity was achieved in June of 11)(,7 with installation of an IBM 360/30 computer with 32K srora~e. T he 360 system provided for mu lti-programmi.ng and an eventu al savinp.s <•f more than 2.000 hours of machine ti me nut cha rp.eablc by the l BM Corporation. By November I967. the 360/30 memory capabilit y had. been increased to 65K . By Ma)· l %8. the second and final IBM 360/30 com. putcr with 65 K storage was inst alled, and the remain . ing Jl\60 computer was released. The: two 360/30 computers constitu ted che JSPC- S data prucessin~ svs · rem until the demise of the JSPC in I 97 1. As an example of the net worth these srsrems represented. in 1968 JSPC. emploring all of the ad ­ • [ DOCID: 2909802 vanra,a.:es of multi-programming techniques, operare<l irs rompurers for 16,416 hours, yet the IBM Corpo-. ration was paid only for 14.141 hours . A net savings of 2.275 com.pucer hours wiu realized char year from che innovative procedures conl'eived , rested and used ac rheJSPC. In February 1969 a special purpose recording device named GOODTIME was. installed co replace che sc:-ven paper cape reperforacors of earlier AUTOMATE fame . GOODTJME is a high speed magnetic cape tc:rminal connected co rhe communications center in CRS- 0. Sobe, by one 1200 baud circuit. Data Rowing into GOODTIME are multiplexed onto a magnetic wpe which che computer uses to separate all material of a kind. This device final .ly eliminated all paper tape handling and the inherent waste of 5 hours daily as well as the need to man the reperforawrs throughout the day. GOODTIME is fully automatic and requires manual attention only when a tape is changed or pulled for processing. Average character count into GOODTIME during the apex of JSPC activity was four million characters daily. During September 197() a communications device n.uned .. DLT-5 .. (Data Link Terminal) was installed tn. the JSPC-5 computer area to correspond with a ~imilar terminal in C Group spaces at Ft. Meade. This modified Univac device used a dedicated 600 baud line and was capable of cransmiccing a magnetic tape w , or receiving one from, NSA with full error detec­ tion and correCtion. Consequently, high precedence data reached either end of the link in a matter of minutes. Use of chis link eliminated the need for bulk shipment of data via courier channels. Durin~ August 1970, in conjunction with the planned transfer of analytic functions from JSPC tO NSA. a C Group drawdown message was promulgated . In essence this message discussed rhe orderly transfer uf cumputer responsibilities co NSA with the ultimate discontinuation o f one 360' system on 30 December I <>70 and the other on 30 Jurre 1971 . This two-phased plan was well . defined, and phase one was easily and efficiently completed through the combine~ efforts of CS. JSPC-5 and concerned analytic elements . The tirst 360 system was discontinued on 30 December 11>70. as scheduled. and removed from the area for ultimate shipmen t from Okinawa. The remaining sys­ tem was removed on 30 June 1971 . The door had dosed on the history of unique. efficit'nt and dedicated data processing a t the JSPC. Of the 71 personnel on the JSPC- 5 T /D as of 30 June 7 1, 35 spaces were trans­ ferred to NSA (C Group). and 36 were eliminated from the program as austerity savings. •TOP SECRET UMBRA E:xternt~l Involvements I E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(6) By 1968 it had been decided that rhq lwould be br'-o- eug-:h:--c-:-in_c_o-t7h_, ~~~~~------=-~ FF STRU M program. During September of that year the data systems expert assigned w 1rhe JSPC-04 staff went to Korea to assist I !personnel in the implementation of FF STRUM reporting from outlyin~ L.---..,..----....1 to their central processin~ area. The nt'ed fur th is staff billet had long existed bur was not satisfied until J anuary of 1968 with Change No. 23068 co the FDSR ( RDS 3946). The primary mission of chis new staff billet was ro assist PACEMAKER (AG-22l/ FF STRUM implt'mentation· and w ensure coordi · nation amon~: J SPC elements and beiween JS .PC and SCA units. Secondarily. it was intended that chis position should provide for staff actions to develop J SPC machine requirements co handle all jobs on a more timely- and from a resource viewpoint - more economical basis. To accomplish the latter function. a committee was formed during . Ju l}' of 1968 a!'d en­ titled the JSPC AD~ Advisory Group UAAG ). It consisted of che chairman- -incumbent co the staff posicion- and a representauve (either the Chief or Deputy Chief) from each JSPC division and .staff ~rc>up . Arrival in October of rhe B Group Operational Review Group (QRG) resulted. however. in the dis- continuation or reduction of many then existing machine jobs; the efficacy of the JAAG was questioned. W ithh eld from public r elease Pub. L. 86-36 . 1and its funccion was terminated. I £.0. i3526, section 3.J(b)(3) Considerable time was spent during 1968 and 1969 · .-------, in rhe evaluation ·and critique uf I I Source Wit hheld from TF.CSUMS in attempts to make their outputs usable. public r elease Finally. in January 1970 rhe I I source was Pu b. L. 86-36 provided, through I I a revised Technical Item which was in effecc a sanitized version of FF STRlJM instructions. ·Altho ugh implementation of these instructions was slow. it w nstantly improved . I Isources now provide a report from most of their sites which is acceptable to NSA machine pro­ grams. During 1968 and 1969, JSPC was deeply i nvolved with implementation of the PACEMAKE R ( AG-22) program. The J SPC Scaff Data Systems representative assisted several sites throughout the cheater in con­ ducting collection and forwarding tests of chis new mode. The first cest involving electrical forwarding of data was conducted at the Shu Lin Kou complc:-x. Taiwan, with the JSPC as receipt point and processing · center . Later , as STRAWHA T high speed data links became operational, tests were conducted from Onna Point, Okinawa. Hakata, Japan. Shu Lin Kou. Taiwan, and San Miguel and Clark Air Base, . Philip­ 1 TOP SECRET UMBRA 37 . -=~- · IE.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(3) Withheld from public release Pub. L. 86-36 pines. Finall y, o n 16 L>ec:ember 1970 a full scale cesc of the complete system was conducted from all sites ~---------------Jand the data forwarded to NSA for processing . Operational implemen ­ tation of this system began on a reduced sca le du ring January and February 19iL It was planned that nearlv alii I would he accomplished with · PACEMAKER procedures before the end of 1971. Symbolic of the proportion of tas~s JSPC-5 per­ formed to support JSPC elements, we note from the dosing recor4s that 132 programs were assigned in support as follows: JSPC staffs/ 15. JSPC-1/27. . .JSPC- 2/10, JSPC-3/32. JSPC-4/29 and JSPC-5/ ll). And from a record of work requests from June of 1969 through June of 1~71, the following totals were lound: JSPC staffs/26, JSPC-1/215, . JSPC-2/91, JSPC-5/134 and JSPC-4/ 180. T~e more si~nificant data on machine time these programs consumed is available · in the files of Machine Processing Status Reports ( MPSRs) available at NSA. The capability of the JSPC computers was always an undefined but impressive mystery to local com ­ mands. It was expected that sooner or later someone with an · ADP problem would approach the ..Sobe Processors at Torii Station ... Three of the last examples of such requests occurred during the closrng six months uf the Center . JSPC response was so successful that tht JSPC programmer responsible was specific~lly cited for his oumanding work. The first of these projects was a manpower accounting report for USARYIS. Two programs were written and final runs evolved from 15 manhours and two machine hours. A second project for USARYIS was Project Lantern. which consisted of calculated statistical data based on opinions about human relations . Production was conducted at the 2nd LOG Command , but all other phases were conducted b)· the JSPC. One FORTRAN program was required to)!ether with approximately 45 manhours and five machine hours. The third example was an ammuni­ tion accounting report for the I I c=J Two · programs were required , produccion was twice monthly from April to June 1971, involved five steps and listed runs and cards for a run time of one hou r: approximately 40 manh6urs and six machine hours were consumed in all other .Phases. All three of cht<se projects were classified. Precisely how much unclassified compurer support was provided to non-cryptologic organizations in the PACOM area could not be founq in the records. When such service could be provided conveniently. it was. Support consisted of a myriad of forms; from person­ nel rosters such· as those for the 6990th Securit y Squad­ 38 TOP .SECFCI!T UMBR/";---------, E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b )(3) I Withheld from public release r .. P-ub. . L.--86-36 ron , to ocher items such as Torii Station telephone directories for the USASA Field Station. Sobe. The benefits wert .significant co rapport with Okinawa ­ b~ed units (and others) upon which the JSPC vari · ousl y depended for support or cooperation over the years. More Mission ­ Less Space As JSPCs duties and responsibilities expanded. the demand for personnel and space became critical. Re­ cords available conflict somewhat, but they indicate that che original estimate for JSPC operations space was 50­ 55.000 square feet for a foreseen maximum organiza ­ tion of 620 persons. A requirement for 55.000 square feet was officially levied on USARYIS du ring 1\pril of I 962 by the Department of Army in Amendmenc to NSA Support Requirements for FY63. A building of only · 37,500 square feet was constructed for the JSPC. however. and USARY.IS recommt nded a constructi<m program be developed to provide for the unfilled need. With 460 persons on boarJ by April of 1962- a tOtal to be increased significandy when the Air Division · (JSPC-3) moved into the building during June- the Center occupied on!)• about 30.000 feet of operating space from the 37.500 constructed . Working space was initially reduced by July of 1962. During 1963. the necessary construction was incor · porated in rhe DOD budget for FY64. but was later. deleted. When resubmitted in 1964 it wiu approved and NCA fund s were to be provided to USARY IS in Decem­ ber of 1964. During August of 1965 the contract for the new JSPC building was awarded for a bid of $902. 480 .00 and CWE of $ 986.059.00. including an addi­ tion to the power building. The JSPC annex was com­ pleted and ready for occupancy the last week ofJanuary 1967 rather than on the planned date of 9 October l%6. By the time the new building was ready . conditions were intolerably crowded in the JSPC. The new building mntained 74.036 gross square feet of Aoor space. hut only 57.5 25 net square feet were usable. Requirements for special purpose areas for communications, document reproduction and control. computt<rs and OPSCOM MS further reduced the working space.tBy September 1968. one year after the COMBAT APPLE ACRP program had heen activated under the aegis of the 6990th Secu· rity Squadron (USA- 5.22). and after JSPC space had been made available to transcription functions of the 6990th, usahle Aoor space was reduced to 30. 136 square feet . By that time the strength of the JSPC had expanded to 727 persons. and the crowded working conditions of the early ·6o·s paled in comparison. Requirements for i